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Abstract 
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) is a rapidly growing 
research space with many issues and challenges. One of the 
major concerns is to successfully integrate connected 
technologies, such as cloud infrastructure and edge cloud, 
into ITS. Security has been identified as one of the greatest 
challenges for the ITS and security measures require 
consideration from design to implementation. This work 
focuses on the cyber risk analysis and associated 
concentration of research (ACR2). The introduction of ACR2 
approach can be used to consider research challenges in VEC 
and open up further investigation into those threats that are 
important but under-researched (e.g.  very high/high risk 
level but less research concentration). In this way, this 
research can lay the foundations for the development of 
appropriate countermeasures for the future of ITS.  
1 Introduction 
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) can be defined as 
systems that aim to apply intelligent technologies in the field 
of road transport [1]. Such systems can provide an effective 
way to manage traffic and reduce the number of accidents. 
Many techniques have been developed to serve ITS, often 
taking advantage of cloud computing [2]. However, cloud 
computing is known to suffer from a variety of 
communication performance issues, particularly with mobile 
systems, which can affect the efficacy of vehicular networks. 
For this reason, edge computing, as a new emerging 
technology, is being widely considered for ITS. The authors 
in [3] provide a three-tier distributed computing architecture 
for a vehicular system which includes vehicles, the edge 
cloud, and the core cloud. This is an architecture that 
combines various types of network, such as vehicular ad-hoc 
networks (VANETs), mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) 
and wireless sensor networks, utilising cloud and edge cloud 
computing techniques. Due to the high complexity and 
multi-level connectivity of such a hybrid architecture, a wide 
range of security issues may be introduced.  
To date, there have been lots of research focused on security 
standards and analysis of ITS to improve the road safety. In 
the United States, IEEE proposed several protocol and 
standards for enabling future ITS applications and addressing 
security issues, for example [4]. In Europe, the Europe 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) focus on a 
global standard for cooperative ITS systems, including 
defines the overall communication architectures [5], like 
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication, vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) communication and vehicle-to-anything 
(V2X) communication,  specifies mechanism for secure 
communications in ITS [6], threat and risk analysis [7],  
security services and architectures [8], and so on. In addition, 
the research on cyber threats analysis, issues, challenges for 
VANETs, cloud computing and in-vehicles networks have 
been discussed in detail in various research papers [9], [10], 
[11]. However, the related work in edge cloud is limited. For 
this reason, this work will concentrate effort on the vehicular 
edge cloud (VEC). 
This paper will contribute the following: Firstly, the threats 
in VEC will be analysed from three aspects: the 
communication between the vehicle and edge cloud, 
including vehicle-to-edge (V2E) communication and edge-
to-vehicle (E2V) communication; the communication 
between vehicles (V2V); and the in-vehicle network. 
Secondly, a VEC threat matrix, the Analysis of Cyber Risk 
and Associated Concentration of Research (ACR2), is 
proposed which includes five characteristics: 
• Attack Name: a descriptive name identifying the threat. 
• Asset: the description of assets of the system impacted 
(e.g. components, data, services). 
• Impact on security requirement: the related security 
conditions it compromises.  
• A list of work addressing the issue:  providing the 
related references. 
• Research Concentration (indicating the volume of 
research to importance): identification of which attacks 
need further investigation.  
Identification of research on the attacks has been undertaken 
by searching for, and reviewing, peer-reviewed journal and 
conference papers and project reports, as well as soliciting 
expert opinion. As far as we are aware, there is only small 
amount of work in the area of investigating the threats in 
VEC and no existing threat analysis work has considered 
ACR2. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
main architecture of the VEC framework and the subsystems 
is given in Section 2. The attack surfaces are identified for 
the VEC system in Section 3 In Section 4, the detailed attack 
analysis for the proposed VEC system is presented. Finally, 
the paper is concluded in Section 5. 
2 Vehicular Edge Cloud Framework    
Architecture 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic architecture of VEC. as 
mentioned in cloud computing, the high latency is one of the 
important issues exists in the cloud computing. To overcome 
this, one of the potential solutions is mobile edge computing, 
also known as fog computing. Here the edge cloud used in 
the ITS system is considered as VEC. It used to complement 
the core cloud’s capacity for decentralising the concentration 
of computing resources in data centres, provide more local 
data and resources. It also provides storage and application 
services to the road users such as the core cloud, but stands 
out by achieving low latency delay, fast response time, 
mobility support, location awareness, high availability and 
scalability and improves quality of service for streaming 
real-time applications. VEC allows applications to run as 
close as possible to the end users in a mobile environment, it 
also helps the autonomous vehicle offload resource-
consuming operations and runs applications on multiple 
platforms. VEC can be located physically close or within an 
RSU or can be located as mobile edge computing within the 
4G/LTE-A/5G base stations. 
 
The security of this system can be considered from the 
following aspects: the communication between the vehicle 
and the edge cloud, including vehicle-to-edge (V2E) and 
edge-to-vehicle (E2V), the communication between vehicles 
(V2V), and the in-vehicle network, each will be described in 
detail: 
Communication between vehicles and edge cloud (V2E and 
E2V): V-E interface allows the communications between 
vehicles and edge cloud. It used to generate a reliable and 
low-latency communication between vehicle and edge could. 
Here we consider that the communication between vehicles 
and edge is over 5G.  
V2V: This is a communication designed to transmit 
information (speed, location, the direction of travel, braking 
etc.) between vehicles in real-time. V2V technology uses 
dedicated short-range communications (DSRC). When 
considering V2V communication, there are three main 
devices must be mentioned: On Board Units (OBUs) which 
helps in V2V communication; Sensor network which checks 
the conditions around; Finally, the Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM) which is used to generate cryptographic keys to 
Edge Cloud
DSRC
In vehicle network In vehicle network
BS
DSRC: Dedicated Short Range Communications
RSU:    Road Side Unit
BS:       Base Station
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...
...
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Figure 1: The architecture of the VEC. 
strong sensitive information. An attacker can damage or 
destroy this system by attacking any of these devices. 
 
Table 1: Safety Model 
Security Aspect Description 
Confidentiality 
VEC system should ensure that only 
authorized users can access 
information. 
Integrity VEC system should ensure data is 
accurate and avoid unauthorized 
modification. 
Authenticity VEC system should be able to verify 
identity to ensure that a message, 
transaction or exchange of information 
is from the source it claims to be from.  
Availability VEC system should ensure that 
resources are readily accessible to the 
authorized reviewer at all times. 
Privacy All sensitive message in the VEC 
should be protected. For example, 
identities of the drivers, vehicle 
locations, etc. 
 
In-vehicle network: The in-vehicle network can be divided 
into four sub-systems which are Controller Area Network 
(CAN), Local Interconnect Network (LIN), Media Oriented 
System Transport (MOST), Byteflight, and FlexPay. These 
subsystems can be connected via Electronic Control Unit 
(ECU). The security in this area face lots of challenges, such 
as ECU has limited processing power and memory; new 
countermeasures should be more cost effective and so on. 
 
For such a hybrid framework, security and safety must be 
considered. CIA is a simple but widely-applicable model 
designed to guide policies for information security within 
most organizations. CIA standing for Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability. Later, Donn B. Parker proposed a 
new model for information security called Parkerian Hexad. 
It adds three additional attributes to the CIA trial which are 
Possession/ Control, Authenticity and Utility. These 
attributes are applicable across the whole subject of security 
analysis, if anyone has been breached, it will result in a 
serious safety concern.  
 
To identify a complete, currently relevant list of security 
requirements, an analysis of the ITS with regard to essential 
foundation security attributes has been conducted and this 
analysis is summarized in Table1. 
3 ACR2  
VEC system and its applications are susceptible to several 
kinds of threats, as the system heavily relies on wireless 
communications and the threats can affect its functioning 
which leads to safety concern (accident/collision). The main 
VEC system attacks are related to the security requirements 
mentioned in Table 1. This section explores in detail about 
the main attacks, their security attributes, and the impact to 
the system by reviewing and analysing most of the related 
attacks in ITS, VANET, modern vehicle, RSU, edge/fog 
cloud and core cloud. The research reviewed many academic 
publications and industry project reports such as ETSI-
TVRA [12], EVITA[13], SeVeCom [14], PRESERVE [15]. 
Most of attacks were reviewed and validated by previous 
industry and academic projects, which helps to join all these 
attacks and subsume to a joined risk situation for such a 
system. In addition, more VEC related attacks can be 
explored while developing the real VEC system.   
 
To foster discussion of the ACR2, the risk from the attack’s 
hazard should be determined by estimating the potential 
severity of the attack, and the likelihood that attack will 
occur. 
In this work, three levels have been used, which are: Low (L), 
Medium (M) and High (H). Table 2-4 give the likelihood, the 
consequence and the risk level definitions. Moreover, the 
total number of related references has been divided into three 
level: 0 ~ 5, Low Concentration, 6 ~ 15, Medium 
Concentration, above 15, High Concentration. The 
probability assigned for each risk and concentration level is 1 
for High, 0.5 for Medium, 0.1 for Low. Then the ACR2 is 
defined as: 
2 Probability of Risk Level (PRL)ACR .
Probability of Concentration of Research (PCR)
=   
Table 5 gives the all possible values of ACR2. Firstly, when 
ACR2 = 1, the risk of the attack and associated concentration 
of research is considered as balanced. For example, a high 
risk level attack also gains more research of concentration. 
Secondly, when PRL > PCR, ACR2 > 1, the attacks which 
are under this case is considered as under-researched. The 
larger the value of ACR2, more research concentration 
needed. Finally, PRL < PCR, ACR2 < 1, in this case, the 
attack is considered as well-researched. 
 
By searching, reviewing peer-reviewed journal and 
conference papers and project reports since 2000 including  
Table 2: Definition of Likelihood 
High  
Attack is easy to perform, with highly 
motivated and sufficiently capable 
Medium Attack is feasible with motivated and capable 
Low Attack lacks motivation or capability 
Table 3: Definition of Consequence 
High 
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in 
the highly costly loss of major tangible assets 
or resources; (2) may significantly violate, 
harm, or impede an organization’s mission, 
reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in 
human death or serious injury. 
Medium 
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in 
the costly loss of tangible assets or resources; 
(2) may violate, harm, or impede an 
organization’s mission, reputation, or interest; 
or (3) may result in human injury. 
Low 
Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in 
the loss of some tangible assets or resources 
or (2) may noticeably affect an organization’s 
mission, reputation, or interest. 
Table 4: Risk Level Definition 
        Consequence 
Likelihood 
Low Medium High 
Low Low Low  Low 
Medium Low Medium Medium 
High Low Medium High 
Table 5: ACR2 
                   PRL 
PCR 
0.1 0.5 1 
0.1 1 5  10 
0.5 0.2 1 2 
1 0.1 0.5 1 
 
both reviewed and mitigation technique papers, as well as 
soliciting expert opinion, Table 6 is established. Here, Table 
6 is not considered as exhaustive, but it can raising 
awareness of the security issues in the further VEC. 
 
Table 6 shows the full attack matrix for VEC, includes V2E, 
E2V and V2V communication networks, in- vehicles, and in 
edge cloud.  The selected attacks will be described below. 
A. V2E, E2V and V2V communication networks 
Man-in-the-middle: As its name implies, the attacker is 
inserted between the transmitter and the receiver, for 
example, as an OBU or RSU inserts between two 
communicating vehicles to introduces or inject false message 
or modified the original message.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Attack matrix for VEC. 
Asset ID Attack Name 
Security 
Requirement 
Likeli
hood 
Conseq
uence 
Risk Related Work 
Research 
Concentration 
V2E, E2V and 
V2V 
Communications 
Networks 
(DSRC 
LTE/5G) 
C1 
Man-in-the-
Middle 
Integrity 
Authenticity 
M H M 
[16] , [17], 
[18], [19], 
[20], [21] [22], 
[23] 
M 
C2 Sybil 
Availbility 
Authenticity 
M M M 
[24], [25], 
[26], [27], 
[28],  [29], 
[18], [30], 
[31], [32], 
[33], [34], 
[35], [36], 
[37], [38], 
[39], [40] 
H 
C3 Jamming Availbility H H H 
[41, 42] [43], 
[13], [44],  
[12], [45], 
[46], [47], 
[22], [38]  
M 
C4 Flooding                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Availbility H H H
[48], [49], 
[50], [51],   
[52], [53] 
M
C5 Timing attack 
Availbility 
Authenticity 
H H H [54], [55], [56] L 
C6 Black hole Availbility H M M 
[57], [58], 
[59], [60], 
[61], [62], 
[63], [64], 
[65], [18], [66, 
67], [46] , 
[68], [69], [70, 
71], [72], [22], 
[73], [74], 
[75], [76], [77] 
H 
C7 GPS Spoofing  Authenticity H H H 
[78], [79], [80, 
81], [82], [83, 
84], [18], [85], 
[86] 
M 
C8 Replay attack 
Authenticity 
Integrity 
M M M 
[87], [88], 
[89], [90] 
L 
C9 Illusion attack Integrity M H M 
[91], [18], 
[92], [93], 
[94], [56], 
[95], [96] 
M 
In-
vehicle 
networks  
OBU D1 Inject malware Availability M H M 
[18], [97], 
[46], [98],  
L 
ECM D2 Spoofing Authenticity L H M [99] L 
EBCM D3 
Privilege 
escalation 
Integrity M H M [99] L 
Key 
Fob 
D4 Spoofing Authenticity H M M 
[100], [101], 
[99] 
L 
Keyless 
entry 
system 
D5 Relay attack 
Authenticity 
Integrity 
M M M 
[102],  
[103], [104], 
[99] 
L 
In-
vehicle 
sensors 
D6 
Eavesdropping 
CAN bus 
Confidentiali
ty  
M M M 
[105], [106], 
[85], [107], 
[108] 
L 
D7 
Inject CAN 
message 
Integrity M M M 
[109], [110], 
[111], [85] 
L 
Edge 
Clod 
Edge 
Data 
Centre 
E1 
Physical 
damage 
Integrity M L L [23], [112] L 
E2 
Rogue 
component 
(data centre) 
Integrity M H M 
[113], [114], 
[23], [115] 
L 
E3 
Privacy 
leakage 
Privacy M H M 
[116], [117], 
[118], [114], 
[115], 
[23] 
M 
E4 
Privilege 
escalation 
Integrity M H M 
[119], [120], 
[121], [23] 
L 
Table Notes: H: High; M: Medium; L: Low; ECM: Engine Control Module; EBCM: Electronic Brake Control Module. 
Sybil attack: This kind of attack aims to jam the networks by 
introducing false nodes identities. Thus, the legitimate 
vehicles determine that the false message is sent from other 
legitimate vehicles and cannot detect the real identities of the 
attacker. 
Jamming attack: This attack is realized at the physical layer, 
the attacker inserts noisy signal with a high frequency in 
order to disrupt the communication channel. 
Flooding attack: The attacker aims to flood the network with 
a huge volume of dummy messages which can be generated 
by malicious nodes. 
Timing attack: For the ITS, time plays an important role, 
since the delay in safety message transmission may cause 
major accidents. In this attack, the attacker does not need to 
intercept or modify the message instead adds some time slots 
to delay the message transmission. 
Black hole attack: The black hole attack is widely existing in 
any kind of as hoc network. In this kind of attack, the 
malicious node indicates that it is part of the networks which 
leads to redirecting the message to the node which does not 
exist cause a data loss. 
GPS spoofing: Position information is crucial importance in 
the ITS system. GPS spoofing aims to provide the false 
location information to neighbour vehicles. It can be 
achieved using a transmitter to generate localization signals 
stronger than those real signals generated by.GPS satellites.  
Replay attack: This kind of attack aims to replay a previously 
transmitted message. For example, to manipulate the vehicle 
locations. 
Illusion attack: The adversary broadcasts the traffic warning 
message which produces illusion to vehicles at their 
neighborhood.  
B. In-vehicle Devices 
Inject malware on OBU: viruses can cause serious disruption 
in the normal vehicle’s operations. It can be executed by an 
adversary on OBU via physical access. 
EBCM, elevation of privileges: A person with physical 
access to the vehicle installs a custom device to the on board 
diagnostics II port. The device can run a program which can 
monitor vehicle parameters and execute the control service to 
EBCM. It can prevent the use of brakes. 
ECM spoofing: ECM can be spoofed results in erratic 
behaviour outside of normal parameters. 
 
C. Edge Cloud (Edge Data Centre) 
Physical damage: For examples fog nodes that are managed 
by small businesses and user devices forming clusters. In this 
case, the attacker to be in the vicinity of the device in order 
to destroy it. However, there is a very high probability that 
this kind of attack will be witnessed by various observers. 
Moreover, the impact of this particular attack is limited to a 
local scope: only the services associated with a particular 
geographical location will be disabled. 
Privacy leakage: The flow of information that traverses the 
edge data center can be accessed by both internal adversaries 
and someone who is honest but curious. The edge cloud data 
centre normally used to stores and processes information 
from the entities that are located at its vicinity. However, this 
also provides an opportunity to extract more sensitive user 
information.  
Privilege escalation: The considerable attack surface of these 
edge data centers allows external adversaries to try to take 
control of its services. The edge data centers can be managed 
by professionals with limited security training, or even  
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Figure 2: Research concentration versus risk level. 
 
hobbyists. These infrastructures might be misconfigured, or 
lack proper maintenance. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the research concentration versus the risk 
level. It indicates that the potential attacks in communication 
networks have been balanced researched or well researched 
except GPS spoofing attack, replay attack and the timing 
attack. Especially for the timing attack, it has a high risk 
level but highly under researched. The potential in-vehicle 
networks attacks we considered in this work are all under 
researched. In addition, the potential attacks in edge cloud 
also under researched except privacy leakage which is 
balanced researched.  
4 Conclusions  
Security is one of the greatest challenges for any systems, 
especially for the ITS. Thus, for this rapidly developing area, 
respective security measures need consideration in advance. 
In this paper, an attack matrix has been proposed which used 
to analysis the cyber risks and associated concentration of 
research. The authors believe that this paper would provide a 
threat landscape for such hybrid vehicular system.  
 
The results indicated that the selected in-vehicle networks 
attacks are all under researched. With the development of the 
VEC, the edge cloud plays an important role, and should be 
given more research concentration in the future investigation. 
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